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THE FEDERAL TAX SHARING IDEA
JOHN SHANNON, Assistant Director,
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
This afternoon I would like to answer five questions that are usually
posed when the whole subject of Federal tax sharing with State and
local governments is raised.
1. What is the basic idea underpinning this tax sharing proposal?
2. Why is this idea generating so much attention?
3. What has been the general public reaction to it?
4. How has this tax sharing idea been translated into proposed
legislation?
5. What are its prospects in terms of early legislative adoption?
Revenue Sharing Idea
The basic idea behind revenue sharing is quite simple-strengthen
the fiscal independence of State and local governments by requiring the
National Government to share a designated portion of its income tax
revenue with State and local governments on a no expenditure strings
basis. Thus, the essence of the revenue sharing idea is Federal aid with
no controls.
This proposition reflects the growing recognition across the political
spectrum that the National Government simply lacks the power, person-
nel and perspective to heal all the Nation's ills. There is also the necessary
corollary-increasing public support for policies that promote the de-
centralization of authority and responsibility.
Increased support for the general idea of decentralization is not the
only factor working in behalf of revenue sharing. The emergence of this
Nation as a super power with massive foreign commitments makes it
necessary to develop new safeguards designed to prevent the short-
changing of our domestic needs in general and our domestic instru-
mentalities (State and local governments) in particular. Witness this
assessment by Daniel P. Moynihan:
As far as I can see, an American national government in this
age will always give priority to foreign affairs. A system has to be
developed, therefore, under which domestic programs go forward
regardless of what international crisis is preoccupying Washington
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at the moment. This in effect means decentralizing the initiative
and the resources for such programs. 1
The sharing of Federal revenue with State and local governments in
good times and bad times is responsive to this need to decentralize both
initiative and resources.
This concern for strengthening the position of State and local govern-
ments also reflects the powerful attraction that the concept of "balance"
exerts within our federal system. We are still receptive to the idea of
"leaning against the wind"-of resisting those tendencies and forces in
our system that if unchecked would result in a disproportionate amount
of political power being lodged at any one level of government. Thus, in
colonial times the federalists sought ways of strengthening the National
Government, without undue sacrifice of the powers of the States. Con-
temporary "federalists" are now searching for ways to strengthen the
States and localities without undue sacrifice of National goals. Because
money and political power are so inexorably intertwined, this search
concentrates on developing fiscal mechanisms-such as revenue sharing
-a means best calculated to use the unquestioned revenue superiority
of the National Government to reinforce the advantages of a decen-
tralized system of government.
The Fiscal Propellant
Two of the most disturbing tendencies in contemporary federalism,
however, provide the real drive for revenue sharing. To put it another
way, the reason this proposition is generating so much attention can
be attributed to both the growing revenue superiority of the National
Government and its failure to develop an alternative to the present sys-
tem of Federal categorical grant programs with their countless expendi-
ture strings, conditions, and "guidelines."
Federal Revenue Raising Superiority
The enormous "automatic" revenue growth capability of the Federal
income tax contrasts too sharply with the second and third rate revenue
generating systems of State and local governments-a fact that both
creates a radical fiscal imbalance and poses a clear and present danger
to the integrity of the federal system. Without changing a word of the
Internal Revenue Code, Federal income tax receipts will automatically
increase by approximately $10 billion annually in response to normal
economic growth.
I Congressional Record, September 26, 1967, p. H. 12499. Speech to meeting
of Americans for Democratic Action, September 23, 1967.
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While the National Government, therefore, can count on higher
revenue yields generated by economic growth to accommodate most of
its expenditure needs, State and local policymakers are forced to rely
far more heavily on political action. There is constant need to impose
new taxes and to raise the rates on existing taxes. For example, a study
by the Commission staff revealed that between 1950 and 1967 only 47
percent of the increase in major State taxes-income, and general and
selective sales taxes-was the result of economic growth while 53 per-
cent resulted from legislative enactments.
In addition to this automatic growth superiority, the National Govern-
ment enjoys another revenue raising advantage-its freedom from the
hobbling fears of interlocal and interstate tax competition. The more
limited a government's jurisdictional tax reach, the more apprehensive
the government becomes about its relative tax climate. Two great forces
are heightening this sensitivity to intergovernmental tax competition-
the growing desire of State and local policymakers to promote economic
development and the increasing interdependence of our economy.
This overall revenue superiority of the Federal Government relative
to State and local governments threatens the integrity of the federal
system-an arrangement of shared power that rests on an unstated
premise that each level of government will experience about the same
degree of resistance when tapping the taxpayer's pocketbook.
Federal Aid Categories-Too Numerous and Too Narrow
The lopsided reliance on one method of delivering Federal aid-the
narrow categorical or conditional approach-constitutes a second threat
to the federal system. In effect the Congress is dangling over 400 large
and small fiscal carrots worth more than $25 billion before the eyes of
State and local governments and special interest groups. Each carrot
has been chosen hopefully to provide sufficient financial incentive to
spur the States and localities on to greater action in some field of
"national interest." But evidence abounds that State and local govern-
ments have difficulty absorbing a large number of diverse programs over
restricted periods of time. Moreover, we have seen that the sheer num-
ber of these Federal incentives, each designed to accomplish a different
objective, can produce managerial apoplexy if not financial exhaustion
for those jurisdictions not able to devote the time and resources necessary
to track down and match the last available Federal aid dollar.
Progressive loss of freedom, moreover, is an additional price that
must be paid by all State and local jurisdictions, rich or poor. Pro-
fessor Walter Heller, both a keen student of our intergovernmental
fiscal system and a prominent member of the liberal establishment has
traced the ominous implications for our system of decentralized power.
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"Unless this trend is reversed, Federal aids may weave a web of particu-
larlism, complexity, and Federal direction which will significantly in-
hibit a State's freedom of movement. The picture of Gulliver and the
Lilliputians comes to mind." 2
Public Reaction
The tax sharing proposal has generated a most curious political re-
sponse-applause from the middle and shrill outcries of opposition from
those at either end of the political spectrum. According to public
opinion polls the great majority of the American public favors revenue
sharing. This group, however, becomes a "silent" majority alongside the
strident extremists on the left and the right.
Those ultra liberals who hold strong "centralist" views regard this
proposition as fiscal madness. In their judgment the idea of turning
Federal dollars over to governors and mayors with no strings attached
is akin to a father turning a substantial part of his income over to his
young children with no questions asked.
Thus, those who take the position that Papa (National Government)
always knows best can be expected to throw plenty of sand into the
revenue sharing gears.
At the other end of the political spectrum we find the arch con-
servatives who also view this idea as dangerous-but for far different
reasons. In the judgment of these conservatives one must never divorce
the pain of taxation from the pleasure of expenditure.
There is another curious similarity between the ultra liberals and the
arch conservatives-their gloomy prognosis for the Nation if revenue
sharing becomes a reality. The "centralist" liberal fears that once revenue
sharing becomes a reality the "free" or unconditional dollar will drive
out the conditional aid dollar. They predict that Congress will be under
increasing pressure to dismantle its present conditional aid system and
transfer the dollars now earmarked for conditional aid into the revenue
sharing pot. Many conservatives, on the other hand, are concerned
because they believe that these same "free" Federal dollars will remove
a powerful brake on "big spending" at the State and local level-the
politically painful necessity of having to vote heavier local taxes to
satisfy increased expenditure demands. Thus, revenue sharing is de-
nounced by those on the left for undermining Federal controls and by
those on the right for undercutting fiscal responsibility.
In my judgment these gloomy predictions are totally. unrealistic.
There is no indication that the Congress has any intention of presiding
2 Heller, New Dimension of Political Economy, Cambridge; Harvard University
Press, 1966.
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over the liquidation of the categorical aid system thereby renouncing its
control and influence over the great domestic programs operated by State
and local governments. About the most that can be expected is greater
Congressional receptivity to the general idea of building more flexibility
into its aid structure. This can be accomplished by both tidying up the
categorical landscape (the streamlining and consolidation of many of
its narrow categorical aid programs) and by adding the second aid
dimension-revenue sharing.
The Advisory Commission also rejects the argument that uncondi-
tional assistance would be frittered away by the irresponsible and
capricious acts of State and local officials. Even a cursory examination
reveals that education, health, welfare and highway needs determine
State expenditure priorities in very much the same way as they in-
fluence Congressional aid decisions. Moreover, the charge of irre-
sponsibility invariably rests on the highly questionable tendency to
generalize from a few particular instances. There is also the obvious
rejoinder that if we want State and local policymakers to assume a more
responsible part in governing and servicing the needs of the American
people they must be treated as responsible partners in our federal
system.
Finally, it is inconceivable that revenue sharing would ever reach
such massive financial dimensions as to obviate the necessity for State
and local fiscal prudence. Just as Congress will not preside over the
liquidation of the categorical aid system there is no reason to believe
that they will permit State and local trucks to be backed up to an open
Treasury door. About the best that the State and local governments can
expect is "free" access to a highly limited section of the Federal tax
preserve.
Current Status of Revenue Sharing
Two revenue sharing bills now command Congressional attention-
the Nixon Administration's version (S. 2948) recently introduced by
Senator Baker and co-sponsored by most of the Senate Republicans and
the Advisory Commission's proposal introduced by Senator Muskie and
Senator Goodell (S. 2483-Title I).3
The point must be emphasized that the Muskie-Goodell revenue
3 In addition to the revenue sharing title, this omnibus measure for strengthening
the fiscal position of State and local governments provides for a partial Federal tax
credit for State income tax payments (Title II), authorization to the Treasury to
collect a State income tax under terms mutually satisfactory to the Treasury and
the State government (Title III), and a liberalization of the Federal credit for
State death tax payments (Title IV). This bill carries an estimated "price tag"
of approximately $23 billion over the next three fiscal years.
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sharing plan is similar in philosophy and fairly close in major detail
to that advanced by President Nixon. In order to strengthen the fiscal
position of State and local governments, both the Muskie-Goodell and
the Baker bills would divert a portion of Federal revenue, albeit limited,
for sharing with States and localities on a no-strings-attached basis.
The initial distribution under the President's proposal calls for an
outlay of $0.5 billion in 1971 rising to approximately $5 billion by
1976, whereas the Muskie-Goodell bill would authorize the distribution
of $3.4 billion in 1971 rising to approximately $5 billion in 1976. In
determining the size of each State's entitlement, both bills use essentially
the same approach-population modified by tax effort (Table I).
Under both revenue sharing proposals Virginia would receive about
$22 million for each $1 billion. Thus, under the Muskie-Goodell plan
Virginia would receive close to $70 million the first year of operation.
While both bills initially channel all funds to the State, they differ
considerably when it comes to the subsequent reallocation of Federal
revenue sharing funds to local governments. The President's proposal
mandates a "pass through" of funds to all cities and counties, regardless
of their population size with the entitlement for each locality determined
by the proportion that its locally raised revenue bears to total State-local
revenue. Thus, if a city's locally raised revenue accounts for 10 percent
of all State and local revenue raised within that State it is automatically
entitled to 10 percent of the State's share.
In order to give the States greater discretion in the distribution of
revenue sharing dollars to its localities, the Muskie-Goodell bill limits the
mandatory pass through of funds to those cities and counties with
population in excess of 50,000. To be more responsive to the big city
fiscal crisis the Muskie-Goodell bill also provides that these more
populous units of local government share in the State's entitlement in
the same proportion that double their taxes bear to total State-local
taxes. Thus, whereas Norfolk would receive 3.8 percent of the Virginia
entitlement under the Administration proposal, it would receive 6.7
percent of the Virginia share under the Muskie-Goodell bill.
While these differences may appear significant, they must be viewed
as negotiable. The friends of revenue sharing dare not become too
stiff-necked when it comes to details. The revenue sharing proposal is
too important for the future well being of our federal system to be lost
because of disagreements on these secondary issues.
Future Prospects
What is the prospect for early enactment of revenue sharing? Right
now I would not put it better than 2 out of 5-as far as enactment within
the next two years is concerned.
TAX CONFERENCE
As previously noted, the friends of revenue sharing are exposed to a
cross fire laid down by the extremists at both ends of the political spec-
trum. In addition, the Congress may leave the fiscal cupboard bare in its
effort to effect tax reform by means of tax reduction. There is also the
uneasy alliance between governors and mayors-a union that could
rupture completely if the mayors attempt to ram through a revenue
sharing measure that would by-pass the States completely.
Finally, there is always the question of the so-called alternatives to
revenue sharing-an issue that inevitably arises when the revenue sharing
proposal is debated.
The alternatives are far reaching-Federal assumption of State and
local welfare costs, larger Federal grants for education, special aid to the
major central cities and Federal tax credits for State income tax pay-
ments. While many of these specific proposals have been endorsed by
the Advisory Commission, the fact remains that this discussion of alter-
native methods certainly muddies the revenue sharing waters. To para-
phrase the Bard-under such circumstances revenue sharing tends to
become sicklied over with the pale cast of doubt and loses its name of
action.
This was probably what one Governor had in mind as he handed out
this piece of advice to a group of businessmen, "I understand that to-
morrow your program calls for a debate on revenue sharing. In my
judgment this is a complete waste of your valuable time. You don't de-
bate revenue sharing-you support it with everything you've got!"
The Governor is absolutely right-the cause of revenue sharing and
federalism will be better served by turning out more missionaries and
fewer debaters. Those of us who believe that the maintenance of a system
of shared power is fundamental to the American governmental system
should give highest priority to the enactment of a revenue sharing bill.
We must establish the principle that State and local governments should
have free, albeit limited, access to the nation's prime power source-the
Federal income tax. To put the issue more bluntly, the time has come to
truly federalize the Federal income tax.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF SHARED REVENUE ALLOCATIONS, By STATE
(FoR EACH $1 BILLION)*
STATE
UNITED STATES
Alabama ..................
A laska .....................
Arizona ....................
Arkansas ...................
California ..................
Colorado ..................
Connecticut ................
D elaware ..................
District of Columbia .......
Florida ....................
G eorgia .....................
H awaii ....................
Idaho .....................
Illinois ....................
Indiana ....................
Iowa ......................
K ansas ....................
Kentucky ..................
Louisiana ..................
M aine .....................
M aryland ..................
Massachusetts .............
M ichigan ..................
M innesota .................
M ississippi .................
M issouri ....................
M ontana ....................
Nebraska ..................
Nevada ....................
New Hampshire ............
New Jersey ................
New Mexico ...............
New York .................
North Carolina .............
North Dakota ..............
O hio .......................
Oklahoma .................
Oregon.................
Pennsylvania ..............
Rhode Island ..............
South Carolina ..............
South Dakota ...............
ALLOCATION (MIL.) PERCENT DISTRTBUTION
President's President's
S. 2483 Proposal S. 2483 Proposal
1,000 0 $ 1,0000 10000 100,00
11 rQ 1 91
10 .0
1.2
10 0
9.2
111 0
11.0
12 6
2.5
3.5
31.2
207
50
4.2
42.2
24.6
13.7
11.6
14.8
19.9
5.0
19.4
30.4
40.8
21.1
12.3
21 0
38
6.4
2.5
3.2
32.3
5.4
122.5
23 4
34
40 5
12.8
11.0
53 9
40
11.8
3.7
12
10.1
9.5
112 5
11 6
12 8
24
34
30.8
20.8
4.8
40
44.5
24.2
14.6
12.1
14 8
20.3
5.1
18.1
29.6
40.8
21 5
12.6
20.4
39
6.6
2.5
3.1
31.1
5.7
117.1
24.2
35
41 2
12 6
10 4
53 3
43
12.1
3.9
.121.00
.92
11.10
1 10
1.26
.25
.35
3.12
2 07
.50
.42
4.22
2.46
1.37
1.16
1.48
1.99
.50
1.94
3.04
4.08
2.11
1.23
2.10
.38
.64
.25
.32
3.23
.54
12.25
2.34
.34
4 05
1.28
1.10
5.39
.40
1.18
.37
.12
1.01
.95
1125
1.16
1.28
.24
.34
3.08
2.08
.48
.40
4.45
2.42
1.46
1.21
1.48
2.03
.51
1.81
2.96
4.08
2.15
1.26
2.04
.39
.66
.25
.31
3.11
.57
11.71
2.42
.35
4.12
1.26
1 04
5.33
.43
1.21
.39
I
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COMPARISON OF SHARED REVENUE ALLOCATIONS, By STATE
(FoRt EAcH $1 BILLIoN)*
-(CoNTINUED)
ALLOCATION (MIL.) PERCENT DISTRTBUTION
President's President's
STATE S. 2483 Proposal S. 2483 Proposal
Tennessee ................... $ 17.8 $ 18 1 1.78 1,81
Texas ....................... 45 8 47 7 4.58 4.77
Utah ....................... 5.8 5 7 .58 .57
Vermont .................... 2 3 2.4 .23 .24
Virginia .................... 21 7 20.4 2, 17 2.04
Washington ................. 16 7 16 2 1.67 1.62
West Virginia ............... 9.1 9 0 .91 .90
W isconsin ................... 23.1 24.2 2.31 2.42
Wyoming ................... 2.1 2.1 .21 .21
*The differences in the State allocations produced by the two plans can be attributed to the fact that S. 2483 gives
greater weight to the most recent increase in State-local tax effort and has a somewhat narrower definition of
revenue effort.
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